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Abstract
In this article, I will investigate the origins of the hijab, widely known today as the Islamic 
headscarf, within the Islamic context and explore how its uses, purposes and meanings evolved over 
time. I will then trace the history of the relationship between the Islamic veil and Europe and give an 
overview of how modern European states regulate the Islamic headscarf in the public sphere. I will 
also look at the rulings of international legal and human rights conventions, namely the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regarding the regulations 
of the Islamic headscarf in the public sphere. Then, I will analyze the French headscarf controversy 
as a case study. Finally, I will utilize Charles Taylor’s (re)definition of secularism and Stanley Fish’s 
theory of multiculturalism to explore how universal and particular identities, freedom of religion and 
equality between all beliefs can be balanced in modern multicultural, secular societies.
1. Introduction
It is hard to find an item of clothing more loaded with meanings than the Islamic headscarf. 
As Joppke notes, the Islamic headscarf in contemporary Europe functions as a “mirror of identity” 
which “forces the Europeans to see who they are and to rethink the kinds of public institutions and 
societies they wish to have” (?) and “raised the question of what it is that unites and integrates a 
national society” (??). The Islamic veil has been perceived by the West as a sign of oppression 
and an irreconcilable difference between Islam and the West. This notion was initially introduced 
to the Arab world through colonialism and it has been perpetuated thorough dialectical discourses 
especially after the ?/?? attacks in ???? with the increased Islamophobic sentiments, resulting in 
the prohibition of the Islamic headscarf in the public sphere in some European states. 
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In this this article, I will argue that the Islamic headscarf needs to be respected as cultural 
and religious distinctiveness and be protected in the public sphere in multicultural, secular, 
democratic societies rather than be dismissed as a symbol of women’s oppression or a threat to 
European secular or Christian identity and be excluded from the public sphere. As such, European 
states need to increase the level of tolerance and apply the principle of secularism in ways that 
adapt to diversity and facilitate state neutrality, finding the balance between freedom of religion 
and equality between all beliefs. To illustrate my point, I will first analyze the origins of the hijab, 
widely known today as the Islamic headscarf, within the Islamic context and explore how its uses, 
purposes and meanings evolved over time. In the following section, I will trace the history of the 
relationship between the Islamic veil and Europe to explore how the European discourse of the 
Islamic veil was formed and give an overview of how France, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom and Denmark regulate the Islamic headscarf in the public sphere. I will also 
look at the rulings of international legal and human rights conventions, namely the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regarding the regulations of 
the Islamic headscarf in the public sphere. Then, I will analyze the French headscarf controversy 
as a case study. Finally, I will utilize Charles Taylor’s (re)definition of secularism and Stanley 
Fish’s theory of multiculturalism to explore how universal and particular identities, freedom 
of religion and equality between all beliefs can be balanced in modern multicultural, secular 
societies.
2. The Veil and Islam
The Arabic word hijab automatically evokes images of the Islamic headscarf even for non-
Muslims and non-Arabic speakers due to the recent wide media coverage of Muslim women and 
Islam in general. Surprisingly, the hijab mentioned several times in the Qur’an does not refer to 
the headscarf that is commonly worn by Muslim women in the contemporary Middle East, Europe, 
North America, and elsewhere in the world but is a multifaceted concept that could mean a whole 
range of things from a curtain that separates spaces to a veil that blocks humans from grasping 
the presence or knowledge of God. The conservative interpretation of the Qur’anic teachings on 
the Islamic veil, commonly referred to as the hijab, often removes the text out of its historical 
context and ignores the relationship between specific historical time and revelation (Barlas ??). 
We will look closely at verses ?? and ?? of sura ?? and verse ?? of sura ?? of the Qur’an, the oft-
cited verses that advocates of the hijab use to argue that the Qur’an teaches Muslim women to 
wear the hijab, relevant hadith literature (reports describing sayings and actions of the Prophet 
Muhammad), tafsir writings (Qur’anic exegesis) and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) to analyze what 
the hijab meant in the original contexts of the revelation and also to explore how its uses and 
purposes evolved over time. 
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To start with, seclusion and veiling were not novel ideas that the Prophet Muhammad 
introduced to the new Muslim community he founded in the seventh century as seclusion was a 
long-established practice in Iran and Byzantium, and veiling was observed by peoples of other 
preceding civilizations in the Near Eastern region such as Assyrians, Greeks, Romans, as well as 
religious groups including Jews and Christians (Ahmed ??). According to the Middle Assyrian 
Law from ???? BCE, women ‘owned’ by men were required to wear veils when they went out but 
women who did not belong to any particular men, on the other hand, were prohibited from wearing 
one and they incurred punishment if they breached the law (Goto ???). Similarly, although most 
women in pre-Islamic Arabia appeared in public without veils, some women of the privileged class 
in the towns were secluded in their houses and wore various kinds of veils, ranging from a face-
veil and a headscarf to a cloak covering the whole body, though none of them was called the hijab. 
2.1 The Descent of the Hijab in Verse 53 of Sura 33
Let us first analyze verse ?? of sura ?? and its asbab al-nuzul, an Arabic term meaning 
causes or circumstances of revelation, in order to contextualize and ‘read behind’ the texts. This 
verse is known to Islamic jurists or fuqaha as “the descent of the hijab,” which is “regarded by the 
founders of religious knowledge as the basis of the institution of the hijab” (Mernissi ??). Verse 
?? of sura ??, Al-Ahzab (“The Joint Forces”) reads as follows:  
Believers, do not enter the Prophet’s apartments for a meal unless you are given permission 
to do so; do not linger until [a meal] is ready. When you are invited, go in; then, when you 
have taken your meal, leave. Do not stay on and talk, for that would offend the Prophet, 
though he would shirk from asking you to leave. God does not shirk from the truth. When 
you ask his wives for something, do so from behind a screen [hijab]: this is purer both for 
your hearts and for theirs. It is not right for you to offend God’s Messenger, just as you 
should never marry his wives after him: that would be grievous in God’s eyes. (Sura ??:??)
Although there are many different accounts that relate to this verse, it is widely believed that the 
abovementioned verse was revealed in response to an event that took place on the night that the 
Prophet and Zaynab got married in the fifth year of the Hijra (??? A.D.) as recorded in a number 
of hadith and tafsir writings, including the hadith of al-Bukhari and Muslim, both of which are 
ninth-century sahih or authentic hadith collections. Following is a detailed account of “the descent 
of the hijab” recounted by Anas Ibn Malik, one of Muhammad’s Companions, which is recorded 
in al-Bukhari’s hadith:
Narrated Anas bin Malik that he was a boy of ten at the time when the Prophet emigrated to 
Al-Madina. He added: I served Allah’s Messenger for ten years (the last part of his lifetime) 
and I know more than the people about the occasion whereupon the order of Al-Hijab was 
revealed (to the Prophet). Ubbay bin Ka‘b used to ask me about it. It was revealed (for 
the first time) during the marriage of Allah’s Messenger with Zaynab Bint Jahsh. In the 
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morning, the Prophet was a bridegroom of her and he invited the people, who took their 
meals and went away, but a group of them remained with Allah’s Messenger and they 
prolonged their stay. Allah’s Messenger got up and went out, and I, too, went out along with 
him till he came to the lintel of ‘Aisha’s dwelling place. Allah’s Messenger thought that 
those people had left by then, so he returned, and I, too, returned with him till he entered 
upon Zainab and found that they were still sitting there and had not yet gone. The Prophet 
went out again, and so did I with him till he reached the lintel of ‘Aisha’s dwelling place, 
and then he thought that those people must have left by then, so he returned, and so did I 
with him, and found those people had gone. At that time the Divine Verse of Al-Hijab was 
reveled, and the Prophet set a screen [sitr] between me and him (his family). (“Kitab al-
Istidhan [The Book of Asking Permission]” ???-???)
In this original context that al-Bukhari’s hadith provides, the hijab “descended” in two forms 
simultaneously: one is revelatory form, as God’s message that was revealed to the Prophet; the 
other is material form, that is, a sitr meaning screen or curtain that divided the space between 
the Prophet and Anas Ibn Malik, one of his Companions. There is a sense of urgency manifested 
in God’s immediate response to the situation that Muhammad was facing, which resulted in the 
division of space. The newly founded Muslim community in Medina was struggling to conquer 
Mecca and gain military prominence in Arabia in order to secure their political and religious 
legitimacy, after being defeated by the Meccans at the Battle of Uhud in the third year of the Hijra 
(??? A.D.) during which Muhammad’s wives and other women participated in the “ostensibly 
male domain of warfare” (Ahmed ??). The fifth year of the Hijra (??? A.D.) had been a turbulent 
year as the city of Medina experienced a siege by the Meccans and their Medinese allies in the 
Battle of the Trench and Mernissi points out that the early years of the new Muslim community up 
until eighth year of Hijra was “an epoch of doubts and military defeats that undermined the morale 
of the inhabitants of Medina” (??). It was in this context that verse ?? of sura ?? was revealed: 
the hijab as a curtain and a revelation “descended,” not merely to divide the space between the 
Prophet and his Companion so that he could be alone with his new wife, but to teach the newly 
formed community not to overstep the boundaries, to essentially divide the public / profane and 
the private (the Prophet’s household) / sacred spaces, and “to give order to a very confused and 
complex situation... to be the solution to a whole web of conflicts and tensions” (Mernissi ??), 
which in turn reduced the Prophet’s wives’ participation in public affairs. 
The hijab as a separation was also observed outside the dwelling place of Muhammad’s 
household as al-Bukhari’s hadith reports: when the Prophet married Safiyya bint Huyayy after 
the battle of Khaybar in ??? A.D., people were invited to their wedding banquet that was held 
somewhere between Khaybar and Medina and while people wondered whether Safiyya was to 
be his wife or a slave girl, the Prophet “made a place for her [Safiyya] (on the camel) behind 
him and screened her [spread the hijab] from people,” proving to the people that she was indeed 
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his wife belonging to the Prophet’s household and thus separated from the public or the profane 
(“Kitab an-Nikah [The Book of the Wedlock]” ??). Mernissi also speaks of the three conceptual 
dimensions of the word hijab: the verb form hajaba means to visually hide (with a sitr or curtain), 
spatially separate, and ethically forbid something, thus when taken together it means to separate 
space into two parts and hide the forbidden part with a curtain (??). The kings and caliphs of the 
early Islamic civilizations sat behind the hijab, that is, a curtain, so that they could be protected 
from the gaze of the people. In Sufi traditions, however, the hijab carries a negative connotation 
as it denotes something that blocks one’s consciousness from reaching God. In ordinary usage, 
the hijab signifies certain body parts that separate and protect such as al-hajiban (eyebrows, hijab 
of the eyes), hijab al-jawf (diaphragm, hijab of the stomach), hijab al-bukuriyya (hymen, hijab of 
virginity) (Mernissi ??). The Qur’an talks about the hijab on a number of occasions concerning the 
separation of space between believers and non-believers, the scared and the profane: “and [Mary] 
secluded herself away [from her family behind a hijab]” (Sura ??: ??); “[Prophet], when you 
recite the Qur’an, We put an invisible barrier [hijab] between you and those who do not believe 
in the life to come” (Sura ??: ??); and “A barrier [hijab] divides the two groups [the righteous 
and the damned on the Day of Judgment]” (Sura ?: ??). The Qur’an also refers to the hijab as 
something that prevents humans from grasping the presence or knowledge of God, much like how 
the Sufis perceive it negatively: “It is not granted to any mortal that God should speak to him 
except through revelation or from behind a veil [hijab]” (Sura ??: ??); and “They say, ‘Our hearts 
[pagans of Mecca] are encased against what you [Muhammad] call us to; our ears are heavy; there 
is a barrier [hijab] between us and you” (Sura ??: ?). 
Going back to verse ?? of sura ??, when the hijab first “descended” both as a revelation and 
as a curtain in the fifth year of Hijra, a turbulent year, it was meant to separate the space between 
the Prophet’s household and his Companions, the private and the public, and the sacred and the 
profane in the newly formed Muslim community that did not know boundaries to such an extent 
that some members invaded the Prophet’s privacy and even stated that they would marry his wives 
after his death, as the last part of the verse suggests. The hijab is then something that separates 
space into two parts and hide the forbidden part with a curtain, “rendering visible the opposition 
it creates between inside(rs) and outside(rs), or inclusion and exclusion” (Berger ???) but what it 
did not represent in the original context was the separation of the space between men and women 
in general, as the wives of the Prophet belonged to the same sphere as the Prophet himself, that is, 
the private or the sacred.
2.2 The Jilbab in Verse 59 of Sura 33
As previously mentioned, the hijab initially “descended” in verse ?? of sura ?? as a curtain 
and a revelation to separate the private and public spheres, but not the space between men and 
women in general. In verse ?? of the same sura, we see that the hijab as a partition and protection 
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was transported onto women and divided the female Muslim population: 
Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and women believers to make their outer garments 
[jilbab pl. jalabib] hang low over them so as to be recognized and not insulted: God is most 
forgiving, most merciful. (Sura ??: ??)
In this verse, the word hijab does not appear but instead the jilbab, a vague term referring to a 
range of clothing items, such as a large cloth, a chemise and a cloak covering the face and/or the 
whole / parts of body, is used to represent the hijab, that is, the separation and protection but it “was 
not a question of a new item of clothing, but a new way of wearing a usual one, distinguishing 
themselves by an action” (Mernissi ???). In order to understand the reasoning behind this verse, it 
is necessary to analyze asbab al-nuzul, causes or circumstances of revelation. Medina in the early 
years of the Muslim community was a dangerous place for women, where the Islamic teachings of 
faith-based self-control and individual responsibility as the governing sources of society had not 
taken root and pre-Islamic practices of prostitution and slavery were still the norms (Mernissi ???). 
In biographies of Muslim women compiled by the ninth-century scholar Ibn Sa‘d, it is reported 
that free women, including the wives and daughters of the Prophet and other prominent tribal 
figures, as well as slave women in Medina at the time were able to walk freely in the streets, wore 
the same types of clothes, and were equally subjected to the practice of ta‘arrud, men harassing 
and forcing women to commit zina, meaning fornication (qtd. in Mernissi ???). It is also reported 
that when those non-Muslim men and munafiqun, the outwardly Muslim Hypocrites, who were 
committing such act, were asked about their behavior have said, “We only practice ta‘arrud with 
women we believe to be slaves” (qtd. in Mernissi ???). 
Though the new religion brought to Medina did not eradicate the practices of slavery or 
prostitution, it did recognize slave women as individuals and also recognized their free will. 
The following verse was revealed after one of the slaves, who was a Muslim, complained to 
Muhammad about her plight: “...Do not force your slave-girls into prostitution, when they 
themselves wish to remain honorable, in your quest for the short-term gains of this world” (Sura 
??: ??). At the same time, the new Muslim community had to find a way to combat pre-Islamic 
practices of slavery and prostitution that posed a great threat to the patriarchal Muslim family 
structure while recognizing and granting equality to each member of the Muslim faith, regardless 
of gender and social status. Muhammad reluctantly conceded to the suggestion of ‘Umar, one of 
his Companions and a future Caliph, to institute the hijab for women since ‘Umar believed that “the 
only way of reestablishing order was to put up barriers and to hide women” (Mernissi ???). 
It was in this context that verse ?? of sura ?? was revealed and the hijab “descended” on 
women, that is, the hijab as “a method of controlling sexuality and protecting a certain category 
of women at the expense of another” (Mernissi ???). In other words, the verse is addressing 
a specific issue in a specific context, namely the problem of zina in a slave-owning society of 
Medina, and is advising free women to wear the jilbab so that they become visible and protected 
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from non-Muslim men and the Hypocrites, but not so that Muslim women could be hidden or 
protected from Muslim men. This particular hijab separated free women from slave women, so 
that women of the former category, comprising the wives and daughters of the Prophet and other 
prominent tribal figures, could be protected from zina. Slave women were excluded from the 
institution of the hijab and were reprimanded if they wore the veil as recorded in the tafsir of the 
twelfth-century Persian scholar al-Baghawi, which reports ‘Umar whipping and saying to a veiled 
slave woman: “Hey wicked one, are you imitating a free woman? Throw off your veil [qin?‘]” (qtd. 
in Goto ???-???). It meant that zina was allowed to exist in the streets and the tribal authority was 
legitimized and (re)instituted in the Muslim community, compromising on faith-based self-control 
and individual responsibility as the governing forces of society that Islam initially introduced to 
Medina.
2.3 The Veil in Verse 31 of Sura 24
Now we can turn to another verse in the Qur’an that advocates of the hijab often quote to 
argue that all Muslim women are obliged to wear the hijab. It is verse ?? of sura ??, An-Nur (“The 
Light”), which reads as follows:
And tell believing women that they should lower their eyes, guard their private parts [farj pl. 
furuj], and not display their charms [zina] beyond what [it is acceptable / apparent] to reveal 
[zahara]; they should draw their coverings [khimar pl. khumur] over their necklines [jayb 
pl. juyub] and not reveal their charms except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ 
fathers, their sons, their husbands’ sons, their brothers, their brothers’ sons, their sisters’ 
sons, their womenfolk, their slaves, such men as attend them who have no desire, or children 
who are not yet aware of women’s nakedness [‘awra]; they should not stamp their feet so as 
to draw attention to any hidden charms [zina]. Believers, all of you, turn to God so that you 
may prosper. (Sura ??:??)
This particular verse is a general statement about dressing modestly that seems to be addressed 
to all Muslim women as opposed to the verses from sura ?? that we have looked at, which 
specifically addressed the wives of Muhammad (verse ??) and free women (verse ??) of the newly 
founded Muslim community in Medina. However, unlike the verses from sura ?? previously 
mentioned, there is not much context or asbab al-nuzul provided by authentic hadith collections 
and early tafsir writings for verse ?? of sura ??. Although an account in al-Bukhari’s hadith does 
not elucidate under what circumstances the abovementioned verse was revealed, it does tell us 
how women reacted to the revelation: “When Allah revealed ‘...and to draw their veils [khimar] all 
over their Juyubihinna (i.e., their bodies, faces, necks and bosoms, etc.)...’ (V.??:??) they tore their 
Murut (woolen dresses or waist-binding clothes or aprons etc.) and covered their heads and faces 
with those torn Muruts” (“Kitab al-Tafsir [The Book of the Wedlock]” ???). It shows that certain 
women covered their heads and faces with some kind of cloth in response to the revelation but 
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there is no consensus among traditions on the meanings of the important but ambiguous terms like 
charms or ornaments (zina [not to be confused with zina that was discussed in relation to verse ?? 
of chapter ??, which meant fornication and is derived from a different root]), acceptable / apparent 
(zahara), coverings (khimar), necklines (jayb), and nakedness (‘awra), making it difficult to know 
with certainty whether ‘apparent charms’ referred to outer clothing and accessories or face and 
hands and whether ‘coverings’ only covered necklines and bosoms or included head and face as 
well. Barlas suggests that both jilbab, mentioned previously in verse ?? of sura ??, and khimar “in 
ordinary usage, cover the bosom (juy?b) and neck, not the face, head, hands, or feet” (??) but we 
also learned from al-Bukhari’s hadith quoted above that women used some kind of cloth to use as 
a khimar to cover their heads and faces, which only points to the ambiguity of the term. 
As for ‘apparent charms’, the oft-cited account is found in Abu Dawud’s hadith, one of the 
six major Sunni hadith collections compiled by the ninth-century scholars: when the Prophet saw 
Asma’, a daughter of Abu Bakr and an older sister of ‘Aisha, wearing thin clothes, he said; “O 
Asma’, when a woman reaches the age of menstruation, it does not suit her that she displays her 
parts of body except this and this, and he pointed to his face and hands” (Book ?? Hadith ????). 
Deriving from this account and other similar accounts, early tafisr writers such as al-Tabari (ninth-
century exegete) and al-Baghawi (twelfth-century scholar of the Shafi‘i school of Islamic law) 
argued that women’s faces and hands were considered to be ‘apparent charms’ and thus allowed to 
be exposed in contrast with other parts of the body and accessories for those parts that were ‘hidden 
charms’ that must be concealed from a woman’s non-mahram men (men outside of her immediate 
family) (Goto ???-???). Another important term to mention is ‘awra, which is mentioned in the 
latter part of verse ?? and is defined in the lexicon as “pudenda of a human being,” “the part, or 
parts, of the person, which is indecent to expose,” and “anything of which one is ashamed when it 
appears” (Lane ????). Goto remarks that while there is no concrete definition for ‘awra found in 
the Qur’an and early hadith collections, most scholars and fuqaha of the Shafi‘i school of Islamic 
law up until the twelfth century agreed the whole body of a free woman except her face and hands 
was ‘awra and thus must be covered and not be seen by her non-mahram men while the Hanafi 
school excluded the feet in addition to face and hands, but later scholars and jurists of the Shafi‘i 
and Hanbali schools believed that the whole body of a woman was ‘awra with no exception (???). 
Ahmed attributes the spread of seclusion and veiling within the Muslim community to the 
Muslim conquests of areas where those practices were more common among the privileged classes 
such as Persia and the Levant, the wealth and prominence gained across the region, and Muslim 
women?s emulation of the wives of Muhammad (??). What needs to be highlighted at last is the 
fact that the preceding verse contains a similar, though less specific, message addressed to Muslim 
men: “[Prophet], tell believing men to lower their eyes and guard their private parts: that is purer 
for them. God is well aware of everything they do” (Sura ??:??). Men, as it was with women, are 
here commanded to lower their gaze and guard their private parts. In addition to lowering their 
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gaze and guarding their private parts, women are also taught to dress modestly, although some 
terms contained in the verse such as zahara (apparent), zina (charms), khimar (covering) and ‘awra 
(nakedness) are too ambiguous to know with certainty what they actually meant in the original 
context. Verses ?? and ?? are then best understood as teachings about modesty binding on both 
Muslim men and women rather than a prescribed dress code for women as the Qur’an views the 
body as the source of sexual desire and energy capable of causing fitna (social / moral chaos), but 
not inherently corrupt or unclean. 
3. Orientalism, Colonialism and the Discourse of the Veil
Although women in Islam and the veil in particular became the center of the British 
colonizer’s attention in Egypt in the late nineteenth century, Ahmed notes that the European 
discourse of women in Islam had emerged in the seventeenth century or even earlier (???). Up 
until the eighteenth century, Western knowledge of Islam and women in Islam came from the 
clerics’ inadequate interpretations of the Arabic texts and the accounts of travelers who relied 
primarily on the perspective of the male members of Muslim societies. From the eighteenth 
century onward, accounts focused more on the patriarchal elements of Muslim societies and were 
driven by the motives of Orientalism, which according to Edward Said is a European discourse 
of the Orient, which the Arabs and Islam came to symbolize for a thousand years, that started 
in the post-Enlightenment period and “is not an airy European fantasy about the Orient, but a 
created body of theory and practice” (?) that emphasized the superiority of the West and the 
backwardness of the Orient as a result of European cultural hegemony. By the late nineteenth 
century, the Orientalist and colonialist discourse of Islam and women merged with ‘colonial 
feminism’, which centered on the argument that women of colonized societies were ‘oppressed’ 
by their men and that they needed to be ‘rescued’ by the West so as “to render morally justifiable 
its [the civilized West] project of undermining or eradicating the cultures of colonized peoples” 
(Ahmed ???) through colonial domination although the British colonizers themselves believed in 
the ‘scientific’ discoveries about the inferiority of women and opposed the idea of feminism in 
their own country. The veiled and segregated women of Muslim societies, perceived as victims 
of an oppressive religion, thus came to occupy the minds of the European colonizers. The Islamic 
veil, commonly observed along with seclusion that signified prestige and (women’s) dependence, 
became the target of colonial assaults as it came to symbolize “the oppression of women” and “the 
backwardness of Islam” at once in the eyes of the colonizers (Ahmed ???). The French and British 
colonialist’ utilization of colonial feminism in their efforts to unveil Muslim women are good 
examples of epistemic violence that Spivak speaks of: it is the West imposing its values on the 




4. Overview of Legal Regulations of the Islamic Headscarf in Europe
As mentioned above, the Islamic veil became the target of European colonial assaults and 
the European discourse and Arab discourse of the veil converged in denouncing the veil, which 
was perceived as a symbol of ‘backward’ and ‘oppressive’ Muslim societies and also diverged 
to form the basis of the discourse of resistance wherein the veil became the bulwark of Islamic 
culture. This dialectical relationship is still relevant in the headscarf controversy in contemporary 
Europe as it has been revived by the volatile political situations in Iran, Israel, Palestine, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and most notably by the ?/?? attacks in ???? and the subsequent war on terror 
in conjunction with the media’s obsessive attention on the Islamic veil. As a matter of fact, many 
European states have become increasingly intolerant of the Islamic headscarf in the public sphere 
in the post-?/?? era due to the rise of Islamophobia. 
First I want to give an overview of the legal regulations of the Islamic headscarf in France, 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark. France, the ‘laic’ or 
secular state, adopts the ‘prohibitive model’ of regulation. In France, it is the core constitutional 
principle of strict state neutrality and secularity known as laïcité, which is expressed in the ???? 
Law of Separation between Church and State that formed the basis for the ???? law banning 
the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in French public primary and secondary schools 
by students. Although the law applies to all religious symbols including Christian crosses and 
Jewish kippot, it is widely believed that the law targeted the Islamic headscarf and was adopted 
“to strengthen the principle of strict secularism and gender equality in order to combat violent and 
patriarchal tendencies within Muslim communities” (Berghahn ??). Employees of other public and 
state institutions, and even those in the private sector in some cases are also banned from wearing 
the headscarf though there is no legal prohibition that applies to the latter. Austria, Germany and 
the Netherlands, the ‘neutral’ states, adopt less restrictive model of regulation. Austria has no 
prohibitive laws regarding the headscarf but rather provides several legal provisions that protect 
one’s right to freedom of religion and to manifest one’s belief. Such laws include the ???? ‘Muslim 
Law’, which made Islam an official religion in Austria and the ???? decree issued by the Minister 
of Education that protects the students’ rights to wear the headscarf in schools. In Germany, half 
of the federal states have adopted the prohibition of wearing the Islamic headscarf by teachers 
and civil servants at state institutions in ???? but students in all German federal states are allowed 
to wear the headscarf. The remaining half of the federal states does not restrict public school 
teachers’ wearing of the headscarf (Berghahn ???). In the Netherlands, women are permitted to 
wear the headscarf in public and private institutions except for those who work in the police force 
and courts as mentioned in a ???? policy document. The United Kingdom and Denmark, the 
countries with a Christian state church, adopt the ‘tolerant model’. There is no legal regulation 
of the headscarf in the United Kingdom as freedom of religion is a fundamental right that is 
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protected in a multicultural, pluralistic British society. Denmark before ???? had no regulation 
of the headscarf but the Danish government passed a law in ????, prohibiting the wearing of the 
headscarf and other religious and political symbols by judges in courts. This ban remains to be 
a symbolic one as there has been no report of female judges expressing their wish to wear the 
headscarf in court (Berghahn ???). 
It can be argued that there has been a shift towards more selective and prohibitive 
regulations of the Islamic headscarf in Europe, even among some of the more tolerant states, after 
the ?/?? attacks in ????: the ???? German prohibition of wearing the Islamic headscarf by public 
school teachers in half of the federal states, the French ban on the headscarf in public primary and 
secondary schools in ????, the Dutch restrictions of the headscarf in courts and the police force in 
????, and the Danish symbolic ban on the wearing of the headscarf by judges in courts in ????. In 
addition, some European states in more recent years have taken prohibitive measures against the 
wearing of face coverings, including the niqab (face-veil) and burqa (full-body veil) that a small 
minority of Muslim women in those states wear, enforced in some or all public places: nationwide 
bans in France and Belgium in ????, Bulgaria in ???? and Austria in ????; and regional bans 
in Spain in ????, Switzerland and Italy in ???? and Germany in ????. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in favor of the face-covering bans in in the cases of S.A.S v. France 
in ????, Dakir v. Belgium, and Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium in ????. 
4.1 The European Court of Justice’s Rulings on the Headscarf Cases
Furthermore, the member states of the EU and the Council of Europe are also influenced 
by and are accountable to international legal and human rights conventions in addition to their 
national legislation, namely the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). The EU anti-discrimination directive regarding equal treatment in 
employment and occupation (????/??/EC) and other anti-discrimination directives established in 
???? and ???? reaffirming the fundamental rights recognized in the Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union are incorporated into national laws of the ?? EU member states 
and are relevant to the headscarf issue: “any direct or indirect discrimination based on religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientations... should be prohibited throughout the Community” 
(????/??/EC); “any direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin...should be 
prohibited...to promote equality between men and women, especially since women are often the 
victims of multiple discrimination” (????/??/EC); and “Harassment related to the sex of a person 
and sexual harassment are contrary to the principle of equal treatment between women and men: 
it is therefore appropriate... to prohibit such forms of discrimination” (????/??/EC). A difference 
of treatment of employees and job applicants under special circumstances may be justified “where 
a characteristic related to religion, disability, age or sexual orientation constitutes a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement” (Article ?, Paragraph ? of ????/??/EC). 
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In March ????, the ECJ has handed down rulings on two separate headscarf cases, G?S v. 
Achbita and Micropole v. Bougnaoui, as the national courts of cassation in Belgium and France, 
respectively, requested for preliminary rulings. In the G?S case, the ECJ has ruled that the 
prohibition by G?S, a security services company, of the wearing of an Islamic headscarf at the 
workplace by Ms Achbita, who worked as a receptionist, did not constitute direct discrimination 
mentioned in Article ? of Directive ????/?? as the company placed a general ban on all visible 
signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs in the workplace that applied to all employees 
as part of the company’s policy of neutrality. The Court, however, has also concluded that although 
the company’s “policy of neutrality vis-à-vis its customers” fell within the freedom to conduct a 
business, the ban may have constituted indirect discrimination if it resulted in “persons adhering 
to a particular religion or belief being put at a particular disadvantage,” unless it was limited to 
employees who ‘visually’ interacted with customers and thus “objectively justified by a legitimate 
aim... and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary” (G?S v. Achbita). In the 
Micropole case, the ECJ has concluded that the dismissal of Ms Bougnaoui, who worked as a design 
engineer at Micropole, a consulting company, on the ground that she refused to remove her Islamic 
headscarf as requested by its customer, who complained that Ms Bougnaoui’s wearing of a veil “had 
upset a number of its employees,” was “not based on the existence of an internal rule,” (Micropole 
v. Bougnaoui) and therefore could not be considered “a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement” for a difference of treatment to be justifiable as Article ? of Directive ????/?? states. 
The recent rulings of the ECJ on the two headscarf cases show that the ECJ allowed for 
regulations of the Islamic headscarf in the workplace under limited circumstances and the Court 
seems to be condoning companies’ restrictive measures against the Islamic headscarf as long 
as companies place general bans on all religious symbols for employees who ‘visually’ interact 
with their customers. In both cases, however, the Court failed to clarify how not wearing the 
headscarf could constitute a “genuine and determining occupational requirement” under Article 
? of Directive ????/?? in order for the restriction on the wearing of an Islamic headscarf to be 
considered justifiable and proportionate to the company’s pursued aim of maintaining neutrality. 
Prohibitive regulations of the Islamic headscarf in some EU member states tend to doubly or 
triply disadvantage Muslim (immigrant) women wearing the headscarf as their chances of getting 
a job may be significantly lowered and such regulations are against the abovementioned EU anti-
discrimination directives on multiple grounds of religion, sex / gender, and racial / ethnic origin 
as it is often not clear how not wearing the headscarf constitutes a ‘genuine and determining 
occupational requirement’ for such restrictions to be considered justifiable. 
4.2 The European Court of Human Rights’ Rulings on the Headscarf Cases
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has also handled a number of headscarf 
cases and handed down decisions in favor of countries that prohibit the wearing of the Islamic 
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headscarf in various contexts. Their decisions are based on the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights (ECHR) promulgated in ???? and ratified in ?? Council of Europe member states. 
Article ? (?) of the ECHR specifically deals with the freedom of religion: “Everyone has the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion... either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” 
But limitations to manifestations of religion are also mentioned in Paragraph ? of the same article: 
“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.” In other words, Paragraph ? of Article ? allows for state laws and/or values to take 
precedence over the right to manifest one’s religion that is guaranteed in Paragraph ? as the 
ECtHR recognizes the member states’ margin of appreciation. 
The past ECtHR decisions on the headscarf cases upheld the state bans and regulations of 
the Islamic headscarf as well as face coverings in recent years as mentioned earlier. The Court 
decision of Dahlab v. Switzerland in ???? was that the state restriction on the wearing of the 
Islamic headscarf by Ms Dahlab, a public primary school teacher, was proportionate to the pursued 
aim of maintaining denominational neutrality in the public education system of a pluralistic 
society. The Court agreed with the Swiss government that the headscarf ‘imposed on women’ 
constituted a ‘powerful religious symbol’ incompatible with the principle of gender equality and a 
teacher wearing one in school could have a proselytizing effect and potentially interfere with the 
religious beliefs of pupils and parents and thus the prohibition of it was justifiable and “necessary 
in a democratic society” under Article ? (?) despite the fact that there were no complaints made by 
pupils or parents regarding Ms Dahlab’s teaching or clothing. The Federal Court of Switzerland 
and the ECtHR insisted that the Islamic headscarf was a visibly ‘powerful religious symbol’ 
that conveyed a ‘religious message’ even though Ms Dahlab claimed that it should be treated 
as any other regular clothing item, not a religious symbol, that she freely adopted and so the 
prohibition of wearing the Islamic headscarf while allowing “outlandish or unusual clothing with 
no religious connotations,” was unjustifiably keeping her from dressing as she wished (Dahlab v. 
Switzerland). Furthermore, the Court dismissed Ms Dahlab’s claim that since the state prohibition 
of the headscarf disadvantaged her as a Muslim woman while Muslim men could freely teach 
in public schools without being subject to any form of prohibition, it constituted discrimination 
on the ground of sex that Article ?? of the ECHR protects against: “The enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex...” The Court argued that the prohibitive measure was not taken on the basis of Ms 
Dahlab’s sex but rather of her capacity as a public primary school teacher with the legitimate aim 
of maintaining denominational neutrality in the public education system, therefore did not violate 
Article ?? of the Convention. Though a similar restriction may be applied to men wearing ‘powerful 
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religious symbols’ in public schools, such cases are rare and it does not change the fact that the 
prohibition of the headscarf doubly disadvantaged Ms Dahlab because of her gender and religion 
compared to other persons in similar circumstances.
The ECtHR handed down similar decisions in the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey in ????, 
which involved a Turkish medical student at Istanbul University, Ms Leyla Şahin, who was denied 
access to lectures and examinations in ???? because she was wearing the Islamic headscarf, in 
conformity with a circular that was issued earlier in the same year by the Vice-Chancellor of 
Istanbul University that banned the wearing of the Islamic headscarf and beards in classrooms. 
Ms Şahin applied to the ECtHR against Turkey regarding the violation of her right to manifest her 
religion as well as her right to education protected under the ECHR. The ECtHR ruled that there 
was no violation of Article ? of the Convention because the headscarf was perceived as a symbol 
of political Islam and it posed a threat to the principles of secularism and gender equality hence the 
pursued aim of the Turkish government of protecting “the rights and freedoms of others, to preserve 
public order and to secure civil peace and true religious pluralism, which is vital to the survival of a 
democratic society” was legitimate and the means employed to limit Ms Şahin’s manifestation of her 
religion were prescribed by law and thus proportionate to the aim pursued (Leyla Şahin v. Turkey). 
However, as Judge Tulkens, who voted against the Court’s decision, pointed out in her dissenting 
opinion, the Court again failed to give concrete evidence to show that Ms Şahin’s wearing of 
the Islamic headscarf posed a real threat to the principle of secularism and that it “was used to 
exert pressure, to provoke a reaction, to proselytise or to spread propaganda and undermined – or 
was liable to undermine — the convictions of others.” Judge Tulkens also mentioned that “only 
indisputable facts and reasons whose legitimacy is beyond doubt – not mere worries or fears—
are capable of satisfying that requirement justifying interference with a right guaranteed by the 
Convention” (Leyla Şahin v. Turkey). Instead of questioning the unfounded assumptions of the 
Turkish government, the Court affirmed such assumptions to justify their interference with a 
person’s fundamental right to freedom of religion and her right to education. Consequently, the 
margin of appreciation given to the Turkish government by the ECtHR was too wide especially 
given that the case dealt with the issue of the fundamental right to freedom of religion that should 
concern all member states. 
In the cases of Dahlab v. Switzerland in ???? and Leyla Şahin v. Turkey in ????, by 
allowing each member state to decide on the limitations to religious manifestations, the ECtHR 
permitted the strict separation of public and private spheres and the relegation of religion to the 
private sphere in order to homogenize and keep religion out of the public educational institutions. 
However, in response to a complaint filed by an atheist parent and her children in the case of 
Lautsi and Others v. Italy in ????, who claimed that the presence of crucifixes in classrooms of 
Italian State schools interfered with their freedom of conscience and their right to education, the 
ECtHR ruled that the display of crucifixes in classrooms of Italian State primary and secondary 
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schools, prescribed by internal regulations, did not infringe on the principle of state neutrality 
in the field of education or the right to education protected under the ECHR: “No person shall 
be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to 
education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education 
and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions” (Article ? 
of Protocol No.?). The Court claimed that while it cannot be denied that a crucifix is a symbol 
of Christianity and that its visibility cannot be ignored in classrooms, a crucifix on a wall 
nevertheless is an “essentially passive symbol” that “cannot be deemed to have an influence on 
pupils compared to that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities,” when there 
was no sufficient evidence to prove that “the display of a religious symbol on classroom walls 
may have an influence on pupils” (Lautsi and Others v. Italy). Furthermore, the Court went on 
to argue that the crucifix’s undeniable association with Christianity is not to be confused with 
“compulsory teaching about Christianity” because “the applicants did not assert that the presence 
of the crucifix in classrooms had encouraged the development of teaching practices with a 
proselytising tendency” (Lautsi and Others v. Italy). The ECtHR’s decision and its assessment of 
this case reveal the ECtHR’s lack of consistency as they are in stark contrast to those of Dahlab v. 
Switzerland in ???? and Leyla Şahin v. Turkey in ???? even though all of the cases dealt with the 
same issue, the presence of religious symbols in public educational institutions, but with different 
symbols that generated contrasting responses: the Islamic headscarf on the one hand, perceived 
as a powerful religious symbol that posed a threat to the principle of secularism and could not be 
tolerated, and the crucifix on the other hand, perceived as a passive symbol that did not infringe on 
the same principle and could be tolerated. 
Additionally, in the case of Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom in ???? that involved a 
Christian employee, Ms Eweida, who worked for British Airways and was refused by the company 
to continue her work that required interaction with customers because she wore a cross outside her 
clothing against the company’s uniform policy, the ECtHR ruled in favor of Ms Eweida and awarded 
her damages for the state’s violation of her right to manifest her religious belief, including her 
right to communicate her belief to others. The ECtHR ruled that although the UK law sufficiently 
accommodated the freedom of religion outlined in the ECHR, the UK courts failed to protect Ms 
Eweida’s right when the law was applied. It concluded that, contrary to the rulings of the UK courts, 
the company’s prohibition of wearing a cross with the aim of protecting its corporate image was not 
proportionate or justifiable under Article ? (?) because Ms Eweida’s cross was “discreet and could 
not have detracted from her professional appearance,” and there was “no evidence that wearing 
of other, previously authorised, items of religious clothing, such as turbans and hijabs, by other 
employees, had any negative impact on British Airways’ brand or image” (Eweida and Others v. 
United Kingdom). Here again we see a lack of consistency and a double standard in the rulings of the 
ECtHR: when the Court dealt with cases that involved regulations of the Islamic headscarf in the 
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public sphere, a wide margin of appreciation was given to the governments of the member states 
and restrictive measures were considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and hence legitimate 
and justifiable, leaving unfounded assumptions about the headscarf wearers or the headscarf itself 
unquestioned, yet the Court gave a much narrower margin of appreciation when the wearing of a 
cross was concerned in order to protect the right to manifest one’s religion, including the right to 
communicate one’s belief to others.
4.3 The Headscarf Controversy in France
Next, I want to look at the headscarf controversy in France in detail as a case study. The 
headscarf controversy (Afffaire du Foulard) in France began in ???? when three Muslim girls 
were expelled from their public secondary school in the town of Creil for refusing to remove their 
headscarves and resurfaced in ???? when the then minister of the interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, fueled 
by his concern with terrorism following the ?/?? attacks in ????, issued a policy requiring Muslim 
women to remove their headscarves when taking official identity photographs. This policy led to 
a bigger issue when Socialist deputy Jack Lang proposed a bill that would prohibit the displaying 
of religious affiliation in public schools (Scott ??). In the midst of the policy debate, two Jewish 
sisters who converted to Islam, Alma and Lila Levy, gained public attention. The sisters were 
expelled from their high school in the northern Paris suburb of Aubervilliers in ???? after refusing 
to remove their headscarves or to wear a ‘lighter’ veil. Their decisions to wear the headscarves 
were free of family or communal pressure, “contrary to the explanations offered by those who 
sought to ban the foulard in order to liberate women from the control of Islamist men” (Scott 
??). Then President Jacque Chirac established the Stasi commission in July ???? to investigate 
the applicability of the principle of laïcité to the headscarf issue in French public schools. The 
commission issued a report in December ???? that recommended the ban on the wearing of 
conspicuous religious symbols in public primary and secondary schools. The commission also 
issued other recommendations that called for more religious tolerance, including providing pork-
free meals at schools and hospitals and recognizing Jewish and Muslim holidays as national 
holidays. However, in ???? then President Jacques Chirac only accepted the ban on the Islamic 
headscarf (and other ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols) in public primary and secondary schools, 
which became a law that took effect in the same year. The ???? law marked a critical moment for 
the headscarf controversy in France: “there would be no longer be compromises or mediation — it 
was either Islam or the republic” (Scott ??). 
The justifying reasons that the supporters of the ???? French headscarf ban give are that the 
headscarf “violated the separation of church and state, insisted on differences among citizens in 
a nation one and indivisible,” and also that it became the “ultimate symbol of Islam’s resistance 
to modernity” (Scott ?). They also often cite liberalism to justify the ban because the headscarf 
supposedly oppresses women and infringes on the basic principles of liberalism, which are, 
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equality and universal rights of individuals (O’Brien ??). When contrasted with the reality of 
Muslim students in French public schools, however, it becomes clear that those reasons are in fact 
unjustifiable and points to another driving force behind the ban. The number of headscarf wearers 
and disruptive acts caused by them did not increase between ???? and ???? when the headscarf 
controversy intensified and many of those who did wear it did so by their own will, free of 
family or communal pressure. Moreover, the polls conducted proved that more and more Muslim 
immigrants were “becoming more secular, more integrated into French society” as noted by Scott 
(??). It is rather Islamophobia that accelerated in the aftermath of the ?/?? attacks followed by 
other terrorist attacks that has been the major underlying force of the ban, as the headscarf became 
the most visible sign of the presence of Islam in Europe. The increased number of immigrants 
coming from the French ex-colonies and other Muslim-majority countries to Europe has added 
to anti-Islamic sentiments and the fear that Islam may conquer Europe “thorough immigration, 
naturalization, and high birthrates” (Elver ???). 
The headscarf controversy in France has continued to resurface time and again and each 
time it has taken on different dimensions as the administrations of the left and right took office. 
As mentioned above, Nicolas Sarkozy’s conservative government issued a ban on face coverings 
in ???? enforced in all public places. In ????, Sarkozy’s education minister issued a non-legally 
binding memo which recommended schools to maintain the neutrality principle and bar mothers 
who wear Islamic headscarves from accompanying their children on school trips. The succeeding 
president François Hollande of the Socialist Party, rather than overturning the said memo, 
announced in ???? that a new law banning the wearing of the headscarves by employees in private 
nurseries was needed, after the French high court ruled in favor of a former employee at a private 
nursery who was unfairly dismissed from work because of her headscarf. Hollande reasoned that 
a new law was needed since employees at private nurseries come in direct contact with children 
and children have to be protected from being exposed to religious symbols, thereby attempting to 
extend the headscarf ban to the private sector (Chrisafis, “France’s Headscarf war: ‘It’s an Attack 
on Freedom’”). In ????, the former president Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a ban on the Islamic 
headscarf in French universities, which was supported by the then minister for women’s rights as 
well as then Prime Minister Manuel Valls of the Socialist Party but opposed by other ministers 
of the Socialist government and university presidents (Chrisafis, “French PM Calls for Ban on 
Islamic Headscarves at Universities”). 
There has been a hopeful turn of events since Emmanuel Macron, a self-declared feminist, 
took office in May ????. To be clear, the president is in no way opposed to the ???? law banning 
the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in French public schools. However, he is opposed 
to extending the ban to other sectors of society, including universities and mothers accompanying 
their children on school trips as the past administrations have attempted to do. Marlene Schiappa, 
who is the minister of gender equality and the youngest member of Macron’s cabinet, takes a 
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bolder stance against the ???? law and the application of the ban in other sectors of society. 
Schiappa rightly points out that it is stipulated in the ???? Law of Separation between Church and 
State that the Republic ‘does not recognize, subsidize or support any religion’ but by prohibiting 
the Islamic headscarf in public schools, the ???? law recognizes the headscarf as a religious 
symbol and thus recognizes a religion, which is contrary to the ???? law. She further claims that 
banning mothers who don the headscarf from accompanying their children on school trips has no 
legal basis since the ???? state neutrality law applies only to civil servants and representatives 
of the state and not students’ mothers, and such ban would increase Islamophobia (Hausalter, 
“‘Islamophobie’, voile à l'école : Macron a-t-il bien lu sa secrétaire d'Etat Marlène Schiappa?”). It 
remains to be seen how the Macron administration will deal with the question of laïcité in relation 
to Islamic clothing in the future but for now, continuous and obsessive attacks on the Islamic 
headscarf and clothing and further encroachment on the private sphere seem to have come to a 
halt. 
5. (Re)definition of Secularism in Modern Secular States
Charles Taylor’s (re)definition of secularism brings to light the problems involved in the 
French controversial ban on the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public schools. 
Taylor first outlines the three main basic goals of modern democratic secular states, which 
originate in the French Revolution: liberty, equality and fraternity. Religious liberty or liberty of 
conscience ensures the freedom to follow or not follow one’s religious / ethical beliefs and the 
state must guarantee equality between all religious / ethical beliefs, and fraternity means that all 
are included in the “consensus-building process” in order to maintain “harmony and comity” (??). 
Taylor argues that when secularism, taken as one of the unchanging absolute principles grounded 
in non-religious pure reason, is applied to find the right balance between the three goals, we find 
ourselves in conflicting situations because there are no absolute principles that can be applied to 
all kinds of situations at different times and so adjustments have to be made to adapt to changing 
situations (??). For instance, when France applies the principle of laïcité to the headscarf issue in 
public schools in the same ways that the radicals of the Third Republic did in their battle against 
the monarchists and the Catholic church, it shows that its response to diversity and religious 
pluralism, which are common characteristics of contemporary Western societies, is anachronistic 
and alienates Muslim communities. Instead of interpreting secularism as an unchanging principle 
used as a bulwark against religion whose sole purpose is the separation of state and religion, 
Taylor points out that it should be redefined as a principle that balances the three basic goals 
by adapting to diversity and facilitating state neutrality whose purpose is to “avoid favoring or 
disfavoring not just religious positions but any basic position, religious or nonreligious” (??) 
and also to protect the foundational political principles of modern secular states (ideally) shared 
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by all people, religious and nonreligious, which are human rights, equality, the rule of law, and 
democracy. 
Another issue with the principle of secularism is that it is often linked with ‘fetishized’ 
institutional arrangements, such as the strict separation of public and private spheres and the 
relegation of religion to the private sphere, that are considered absolute and unchangeable (Taylor 
??). Taylor notes that diversifying democratic societies need to stop being “oddly fixated on 
religion as something strange and perhaps even threatening” (??) and instead express the three 
basic norms of modern liberal societies (human rights, equality and democracy) in a “philosophy 
of civility” that is neither religious nor anti-religious by upholding an “overlapping consensus” 
among people with different world views (??-??). In the case of the headscarf issue in French 
public schools, instead of clinging onto its historical institutional arrangement based on laïcité, 
perceived as an integral part of its political and historic identity, France needs to (re)create 
institutional arrangements that maximize the three basic goals by balancing freedom of religion 
and state neutrality in public institutions, paying due attention to the fact that French society is 
becoming increasingly multicultural, diverse and plural.
6. Boutique Multiculturalism and Strong Multiculturalism
I will now turn to Stanley Fish’s theory of multiculturalism to shed some more light on 
the headscarf issue. Fish defines two types of multiculturalism: boutique multiculturalism and 
strong multiculturalism. Fish explains that boutique multiculturalism is “the multiculturalism of 
ethnic restaurants, weekend festivals, and high profile filtrations with the other” (???), and as 
such, boutique multiculturalists respect, enjoy and patronize other cultures but will stop doing so 
when they encounter certain beliefs or practices that they consider to be distasteful and irrational. 
In other words, the boutique multiculturalist “resists the force of culture he appreciates at 
precisely the point at which it matters most to its strongly committed members” (???). Boutique 
multiculturalists believe that all human beings, regardless of their cultures, share universal values, 
identity, and human potential for reason, which constitute the core or essence of humanity and form 
the basis for equality and equal rights. For them, universal values take precedence over local values 
or cultural differences despite the fact that it is actually those differences that constitute the core 
values for the committed members of a certain culture, because boutique multiculturalists consider 
differences to be mere products of human potential hence unimportant and negligible. Boutique 
multiculturalists thus only offer superficial respect for other cultures because when ‘irrational’ or 
‘accidental’ difference manifests itself and infringes on the so-called universal identity, they stop 
respecting that culture. Equal human rights should be granted for all, they would say, in order to 
protect the sameness of humanity, that is, human potential for reason but not the differences per se. 
Strong multiculturalism, by contrast, “values difference in and for itself rather than as a 
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manifestation of something more basically constitutive” (Fish ???). For strong multiculturalists, 
it is cultural differences that they respect and protect first and foremost not because they are the 
products of human reason but because they constitute the core values of each culture. Unlike 
boutique multiculturalists, strong multiculturalists tolerate and show ‘deep’ respect for cultures, as 
they believe that cultural values prevail over universal values and distinctiveness or particularity 
over sameness and homogeneity. However, the strong multiculturalist also runs into a problem: 
the multiculturalist dilemma. Strong multiculturalists face the dilemma when cultural values of 
the other collide with theirs and those cultures are not ready to tolerate their values. When faced 
with such a situation, they have to either tolerate the intolerance of the other, which requires that 
they reject their own values, or stop tolerating that culture and reject the core values of the other. 
If they choose the former path, they become really strong multiculturalists, who adamantly defend 
a particular difference of the other culture at the expense of their own values, which in turn will 
make them uniculturalists. If, on the other hand, they choose the latter path, it shows that they 
are not really strong multiculturalists but boutique multiculturalists in disguise, as they no longer 
respect the difference and value universal identity more than particular identity. Fish therefore 
rules out the possibility of being a multiculturalist in any philosophically sound way (???). 
6.1 Balance between Universal and Particular Identities
Now I will apply Fish’s concepts of boutique multiculturalism and strong multiculturalism to 
analyze how modern European states, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) regulate the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in the public sphere. It 
can be argued that the approaches taken by the ‘neutral’ states and countries with a state church 
are a combination of boutique multiculturalism and strong multiculturalism whereas France’s, 
the ECJ’s and the ECtHR’s approaches are more boutique multiculturalist. Austria and the United 
Kingdom, the ‘neutral’ state and the country with a state church, have managed to strike a balance 
between boutique multiculturalism and strong multiculturalism, that is, between universal and 
particular identities, without running into the multiculturalist dilemma. Neither Austria nor the U.K. 
prohibits the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in the public and private sectors because as boutique 
multiculturalists, both countries believe that one’s right to freedom of religion and to manifest 
one’s belief are fundamental human rights shared by all human beings that need to be protected. 
At the same time, as strong multiculturalists, those countries show deep respect for other cultures 
by tolerating the difference (the Islamic headscarf) and allowing it to appear in the public sphere. 
They prioritize distinctiveness and particularity over sameness and homogeneity of the public 
sphere. The Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, the ‘neutral’ states and the country with a state 
church, have adopted some prohibitive regulations under limited circumstances such as banning 
the headscarves in the police force and courts, where secularity takes precedence over particular 
difference. Overall, they still manage to respect distinctiveness, as they do not ban the headscarf in 
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most areas of the public sphere. Those states are prevented from plunging into the multiculturalist 
quagmire where they have to choose between extreme tolerance and intolerance, as they often 
manage to find the balance between universal rights and distinctiveness. 
By contrast, France, the strict secular state, as well as the European Court of Human Rights 
to a large extent and the European Court of Justice to some extent are boutique multiculturalists. 
They respect other cultures but reject them when they encounter certain difference (the Islamic 
headscarf) that they find is incompatible with their own (European) cultures. They oftentimes 
cannot tolerate the headscarf in the public sphere because it is perceived as a threat to the 
homogeneity and sameness of the secular public sphere. For them, it is (secular) rationality, 
that is, the universal identity shared by all human beings that needs to be protected but not the 
particular identity because differences are mere products of human reason and some differences 
are considered a threat in a nation ‘one and indivisible’ as in the French case. Although issues 
of multiculturalism may not be logically resolved as Fish points out, it is still possible to “figure 
out a way for these differences to occupy the civic and political space of this community without 
coming to blows” (???). In the case of the headscarf issue, many ‘neutral’ states and countries 
with a state church have managed to find the balance between universal and particular identities 
by tolerating the difference in most areas of the public sphere whereas France, the ECJ and the 
ECtHR have failed to do so by not allowing particular difference, perceived as a threat to the 
universal identity, to enter the homogeneous, secular public sphere.
7. Conclusion
We have seen that the hijab as a separation and protection that ‘descended’ on specific 
groups of people to serve specific purposes in the original contexts was later absorbed by and 
redefined to be a veil required of all Muslim women as the practice of veiling spread among the 
Muslim community. This polysemous veil has been perceived by the West as a sign of oppression 
and an irreconcilable difference between Islam and the West. This notion was initially introduced 
to the Arab world through colonialism and it has been perpetuated thorough dialectical discourses 
especially after the ?/?? attacks in ???? with the increased Islamophobic sentiments. As a result, 
many European states have become increasingly intolerant of the Islamic headscarf in the public 
sphere as more European states are becoming ‘boutique multiculturalists’ with the level of 
tolerance becoming ever lower when encountered with particular differences that are considered 
a threat to the universal identity. But as the analysis of the ECJ and the ECtHR rulings and the 
French case study showed, the difference is overdetermined and the perceived threat to European 
secular or Christian identity is unjustifiably exaggerated without concrete evidence. Contrary 
to unfounded assumptions often made about Muslim women who wear the headscarves, many 
of them choose to don the headscarf by their own will without political or proselytising intent. 
Yoko Yamashita
34
In many cases, there is no concrete evidence to prove that they are infringing on the rights and 
freedoms of others for restrictions on the wearing of headscarves to be rendered justifiable. 
Furthermore, it is often unclear how not wearing the headscarf constitutes a ‘genuine and 
determining occupational requirement’ in order for the restrictions on the wearing of an Islamic 
headscarf to be considered justifiable and proportionate in the workplace in the EU member states. 
As such, the Islamic headscarf needs to be respected as cultural and religious distinctiveness and 
be protected in the public sphere in multicultural, secular, democratic societies rather than be 
treated as Islam’s resistance to modernity or women’s oppression or a threat to European secular 
or Christian identity. In order to do so, rather than interpreting secularism as an unchanging 
principle used as a bulwark against religion and clinging onto the ‘fetishized’ institutional 
arrangements, modern secular, democratic states need to increase the level of tolerance and allow 
Muslim women to wear the headscarf in the public sphere by applying the principle of secularism 
in ways that adapt to diversity and facilitate state neutrality and that maximize the three basic 
goals of modern democratic secular states, which are liberty, equality and fraternity, and find the 
balance between universal and particular identities, freedom of religion and equality between all 
beliefs. 
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